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Fertility for a given period is commonly measured by the Total Fertil-
ity Rate (TFR). However, the TFR is sensitive to changes in the age 
at childbearing, which has been rising in most European countries 
for several decades. In Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and 
Switzerland women now have their first child on average after age 
30. As births are shifted to later ages, they are both postponed into 
the future and spread over a longer period of time. This “stretch-
ing” of reproduction results in a depressed period TFR, even if the 
number of children that women have over their lifetime does not 
change. Therefore, the prevailing method of measuring fertility has 
led to the systematic overstating of low birth rates.
Alternative indicators to TFR have been developed in the search 
for a more accurate measure of the mean number of children per 
woman in a calendar year. Here we compare two such indicators: 
Tempo-adjusted TFR proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney in 1998 
(TFR(BF)) and Tempo and Parity-adjusted Total Fertility (TFRp*) 
analysed by Bongaarts and Sobotka in 2012. The TFR(BF) is based 
on birth order-specific Total Fertility Rates and mean ages at birth. 
In contrast, TFRp* goes further by taking into account the parity 
composition of women of reproductive age, thus controlling for an 
additional source of distortion in the conventional TFR. Moreover, 
TFRp* yields considerably more stable results than TFR*, which is 
clearly illustrated in the country graphs shown here. However, lim-
ited availability of detailed data is an obstacle to its use. Wherever 
possible, in this data sheet we used the results for the TFRp* from 
2014, which were computed for 22 European countries, Japan and 
the United States. For countries lacking the required data, this data 
sheet features the TFR(BF) or its estimate (indicated by an asterisk), 
averaged over the 3-year period of 2013–2015. For EU countries, 
the adjusted fertility rate was 1.75 in 2014, about 10% higher than 
the 1.59 estimated by conventional TFR.
The graphs illustrate conventional TFR and its alternatives for 
1980–2016 or 2017 in five countries with different fertility patterns: 
Austria, Czechia, Norway, Russia and Spain. The graphs depict dif-
ferences between the two tempo-adjusted indicators, TFR(BF) and 
TFRp*, and show the course of fertility postponement as measured 
by the rise in the mean age at first birth. They further reveal that 
in some cases fertility postponement has resulted in a huge gap 
between conventional and tempo-adjusted fertility, especially in 
Czechia in the late 1990s when the TFR fell below 1.2, while the 
TFRp* stayed above 1.8. In both Czechia and Spain, the graphs also 
illustrate temporary reversals of TFR trends after the onset of the 
economic recession in 2008. In Czechia this decrease in TFR was 
followed by its robust recovery. For Russia, data suggest that pro-
natalist policies introduced in 2006 with the launching of the “ma-
ternal capital” initiative, had a much stronger effect on conventional 
TFR (and thus also on the timing of births) than on the tempo- and 
parity-adjusted TFRp*.
The data indicate a broad reduction in the disparity between con-
ventional and tempo-adjusted fertility after the turn of the century. 
This convergence was mostly linked to the weakening of fertility 
postponement and the expected recovery of the period TFR, but 
in the case of Spain a long-term decline in TFRp* also significantly 
contributed to this trend. However, we observe wide variation in this 
general trend. For example, a fall in the TFR of Norway starting in 
2010 appears to be entirely driven by a renewed postponement of 
childbearing, with the TFRp* remaining stable.
Evidence suggests that the postponement of childbearing has not 
yet fully run its course and may still considerably distort European 
fertility indicators into the future. The indicators of tempo-adjusted 
fertility will therefore continue providing invaluable information on 
changes in the underlying level of fertility, as demonstrated by their 
stability (especially in Austria, Czechia and Norway), contrasting 
with the frequent ups and downs that have come with using con-
ventional Total Fertility Rates over the last three decades.
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Tempo effect and adjusted indicators of total fertility
Figure 1: Fertility trends in Czechia, 1980–2016 Figure 2: Fertility trends in Austria, 1980–2016 Figure 3: Fertility trends in Spain, 1980–2016 Figure 4: Fertility trends in Russia, 1980–2016 Figure 5: Fertility trends in Norway, 1980–2017
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Country
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
1.1.2017 2016 2016 1.1.2017 1.1.1990 1990–2017 2016 2014 2016 Women born 1976 2016 1.1.2017 2015 2015 2015 2014–2016 2014–2016 2015 2010
Albania 2.9 4 -7 - 3.3 -12 1.56 - 25.7 2.34 - 80.1 77.0 - - - 26 18 9 12 - - - - 1.7 - Albania
Armenia 3.0 4 - - 3.5 -15 1.62 1.87 24.7 1.61 - 78.4 71.5 18 - - 32 29 23 24 - - - - 1.7 - Armenia
Austria 8.8 1 8 19 7.6 15 1.53 1.68 29.2 1.65 19 84.1 79.3 30 58.1 57.9 39 34 19 26 73 83 84 89 1.1 0.26 Austria
Azerbaijan 9.8 11 - - 7.1 38 2.04 2.01 - 1.86 - 77.7 72.9 10 - - 15 19 13 21 - - - - 1.1 - Azerbaijan
Belarus 9.5 0 -1 - 10.2 -7 1.74 1.82 25.4 1.60 13 79.2 69.0 22 - - 37 26 22 21 - - - - 1.0 - Belarus
Belgium 11.4 1 2 17 9.9 14 1.67 1.92 28.8 1.88 - 84.0 79.0 31 64.0 64.4 35 41 26 27 66 78 81 88 1.5 0.28 Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.5 -2 -4 - 4.5 -22 1.26 1.44 27.0 1.82 16 - - - - - 23 17 10 17 - - - - 3.3 - Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria 7.1 -6 -4 2 8.8 -19 1.54 1.70 26.0 1.64 16 78.5 71.3 34 65.0 61.6 41 25 30 22 69 77 83 89 1.4 0.32 Bulgaria
Croatia 4.2 -3 -5 13 4.8 -13 1.42 1.70 28.5 1.68 19 81.3 75.0 32 56.8 55.3 34 22 18 17 66 76 84 83 1.7 - Croatia
Cyprus 0.9 5 3 20 0.6 49 1.37 1.57 29.6 1.94 - 84.9 80.5 25 63.4 63.1 59 45 31 33 - - - - 2.2 0.16 Cyprus
Czechia 10.6 0 2 4 10.4 2 1.63 1.68 28.2 1.76 12 82.1 76.1 31 63.7 62.4 34 24 18 19 71 87 77 93 1.1 0.26 Czechia
Denmark 5.7 2 6 12 5.1 12 1.79 1.89 29.3 1.95 12 82.8 79.0 33 57.6 60.4 46 33 34 27 78 85 88 92 1.1 0.20 Denmark
Estonia 1.3 -1 1 15 1.6 -16 1.60 1.85 27.5 1.83 14 82.2 73.3 32 56.2 53.8 59 36 59 40 77 86 83 92 1.1 0.19 Estonia
Finland 5.5 0 3 6 5.0 11 1.57 1.86 29.0 1.90 20 84.4 78.6 36 56.3 59.4 47 31 49 37 77 81 86 90 1.2 0.25 Finland
France 67.0 3 1 12 56.6 18 1.92 2.17 28.5 2.04 15 85.7 79.5 34 64.6 62.6 52 42 26 24 73 82 84 90 1.4 0.28 France
Georgia 3.7 2 - - 5.4 -31 2.31 2.22 24.8 - - 77.2 68.3 24 - - 55 44 48 46 - - - - 1.2 - Georgia
Germany 82.5 -1 6 15 79.1 4 1.59 1.56 29.4 1.57 21 83.5 78.6 35 67.5 65.3 46 41 28 36 - - - - 1.0 0.31 Germany
Greece 10.8 -2 1 12 10.1 6 1.38 1.51 30.3 1.52 24 84.0 78.9 37 64.1 63.9 53 39 26 29 65 83 81 88 2.1 0.35 Greece
Hungary 9.8 -3 -1 5 10.4 -6 1.53 1.53 27.8 1.65 18 79.7 72.6 30 60.1 58.2 46 33 22 17 67 80 80 90 1.3 0.27 Hungary
Iceland 0.3 5 13 14 0.3 33 1.74 2.05 27.8 2.23 9 84.1 80.4 24 - - 47 32 39 35 - - - - 0.8 - Iceland
Ireland 4.8 7 5 17 3.5 36 1.81 2.01 30.1 2.05 16 83.6 79.9 23 67.9 66.6 69 61 38 36 67 84 79 90 1.3 0.18 Ireland
Italy 60.6 -2 1 10 56.7 7 1.34 1.49 31.0 1.43 22 85.6 81.0 38 62.7 62.6 31 21 14 13 59 80 78 86 1.6 0.33 Italy
Kosovo 1.8 9 1 - 1.9 -7 1.69 1.97 26.9 3.02 - - - 13 - - - - - - - - - - 4.9 - Kosovo
Latvia 2.0 -3 -6 13 2.7 -27 1.74 1.81 26.8 1.65 19 79.6 69.8 33 54.1 51.8 47 25 32 20 76 83 86 90 1.2 0.25 Latvia
Lithuania 2.8 -4 -10 5 3.7 -23 1.69 1.89 27.3 1.76 14 80.1 69.5 32 58.8 54.2 64 49 70 57 78 83 86 91 1.2 0.31 Lithuania
Luxembourg 0.6 4 17 46 0.4 56 1.40 1.80 30.5 1.83 - 85.4 80.1 22 60.6 63.7 47 39 22 31 70 81 82 89 1.2 0.24 Luxembourg
Macedonia 2.1 1 -1 - 1.9 11 1.50 1.72 26.9 2.00 - 77.5 73.4 - - - 16 13 12 16 - - - - 4.2 - Macedonia
Malta 0.5 3 20 15 0.4 31 1.37 1.67 29.1 - - 84.4 80.6 30 74.6 72.7 39 33 13 21 - - - - 1.3 - Malta
Moldova 3.6 0 -13 - 4.4 -19 1.63 - 23.9 1.87 10 73.7 64.9 17 - - 20 15 15 13 - - - - 2.2 0.18 Moldova
Montenegro 0.6 2 -2 - 0.6 -2 1.72 2.02 - 1.93 18 78.9 74.1 24 - - 30 22 17 22 - - - - 1.8 - Montenegro
Netherlands 17.1 1 5 13 14.9 15 1.66 1.86 29.8 1.78 17 83.2 80.0 31 57.2 61.2 47 40 25 31 76 87 88 93 1.0 - Netherlands
Norway 5.3 4 5 15 4.2 24 1.71 2.06 29.0 2.02 12 84.2 80.7 28 - - 57 41 35 34 - - - - 1.0 - Norway
Poland 38.0 0 0 2 38.0 0 1.39 1.47 27.2 1.57 - 82.0 73.9 26 63.2 60.1 51 33 23 14 66 81 83 92 1.4 0.25 Poland
Portugal 10.3 -2 -1 9 10.0 3 1.36 1.58 29.6 1.57 - 84.3 78.1 36 55.0 58.2 40 27 15 11 75 84 88 91 1.3 0.25 Portugal
Romania 19.6 -3 -7 2 23.2 -15 1.64 1.82 26.4 1.58 16 79.1 71.7 29 59.4 59.0 40 28 17 18 62 81 84 90 1.3 0.36 Romania
Russia 146.8 0 2 - 147.7 -1 1.79 1.77 25.6 1.63 12 77.1 66.5 22 - - 43 31 25 22 - - - - 1.0 0.17 Russia
Serbia 7.0 -5 0 - 7.6 -8 1.45 1.66 27.8 1.73 - 78.3 73.2 32 - - 32 21 18 20 - - - - 2.5 - Serbia
Slovakia 5.4 1 -2 3 5.3 3 1.48 1.61 27.0 1.71 15 80.7 73.8 23 55.1 54.8 37 26 19 18 69 84 76 88 1.2 0.25 Slovakia
Slovenia 2.1 0 1 12 2.0 3 1.58 1.64 28.8 1.67 16 84.3 78.2 31 57.7 58.5 44 24 18 16 71 78 86 88 1.3 0.23 Slovenia
Spain 46.5 0 2 13 38.9 20 1.34 1.43 30.8 1.35 25 86.3 80.5 31 64.1 63.9 50 38 26 27 74 85 86 90 1.6 0.23 Spain
Sweden 10.0 3 12 18 8.5 17 1.85 1.92 29.2 1.94 13 84.1 80.6 35 73.8 74.0 55 41 37 31 83 89 89 91 1.0 - Sweden
Switzerland 8.4 3 8 28 6.7 26 1.54 1.74 30.7 1.64 19 85.6 81.7 29 - - 41 44 20 36 - - - - 0.8 - Switzerland
Turkey 79.8 11 2 - 55.5 44 2.10 2.50 - - - 81.0 75.4 14 - - 26 28 7 14 - - - - 1.9 0.05 Turkey
Ukraine 42.6 -4 -4 - 51.8 -18 1.38 1.37 24.8 1.54 14 77.3 67.5 25 - - 26 19 21 18 - - - - 1.7 - Ukraine
United Kingdom 65.8 3 4 14 57.2 15 1.79 2.16 28.9 1.92 18 83.0 79.4 31 63.3 63.7 49 44 32 33 74 86 84 91 1.1 0.31 United Kingdom
European Union (28) 511.7 0 2 11 475.4 9 1.59 1.75 29.1 1.69 19 83.8 78.3 33 63.4 62.7 46 36 25 25 70 83 83 90 1.3 0.29 European Union (28)
European Union (27) 445.9 0 2 11 418.2 8 1.56 1.69 29.1 1.65 19 83.9 78.2 33 63.4 62.5 45 35 24 24 69 82 83 90 1.3 0.29 European Union (27)
United States 325.7 4 3 14 248.0 31 1.82 2.19 27.0 2.23 14 81.1 76.1 24 - - 47 37 38 36 - - - - 1.1 0.23 United States
Japan 126.9 -3 1 2 123.6 3 1.44 1.56 30.1 1.42 29 87.1 81.0 49 74.2 71.2 63 56 38 42 - - - - 1.0 0.31 Japan
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Europe today remains divided by long-term population trends. This 
division mostly follows the past geopolitical cleavage between Eu-
rope’s East and West. 
Countries in the comparatively rich regions – the West, South, and 
North – continue to experience rising population sizes, due to a com-
bination of minor natural population increases and higher levels of 
immigration than emigration. Only a few countries, including Ger-
many and Italy, saw a slight natural decrease in their populations 
between 1990 and 2017, due to deaths outnumbering births. Natural 
changes in population size have been overtaken by trends in migra-
tion, pushing change in the opposite direction. Ireland, Norway, Spain 
and Switzerland as well as several other smaller countries have seen 
their populations expand by more than 20 % since 1990. Except in 
Ireland, migration has driven most of the recent population expan-
sion. 
In contrast, almost all countries in Central, South-Eastern, and Eastern 
Europe saw substantial population declines, due to a combined ef-
fect of natural population decrease and emigration. Several countries, 
such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo (not shown) observed a shrinking of their populations by 
19% or more, unprecedented in times of peace. Several richer coun-
tries of the region – Czechia, Slovenia, and Slovakia – have recorded 
slight population increases and in Russia a large surplus of deaths 
over births has been almost entirely offset by positive net migration 
from the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Despite recurring fears about an impending population implosion in Europe, 
the population is in fact growing. Countries currently comprising the Euro-
pean Union have collectively experienced sustained population growth ever 
since the European Economic Community was established in 1957. The terri-
tory of the current EU-28 member states saw population increase gradually 
through a combination of natural population growth and immigration. Be-
tween 1960 and 2016 the population grew by 100 million, reaching a 500 
million milestone in 2008, and is expected to reach 513 million by 2018. 
Taking into account the rapid expansion in EU membership, the population 
of the European Union, as a political entity, has increased at a much faster 
rate from various waves of EU enlargement.
A s the number of EU member countries grew from six before 1972 to 28 
since 2013, the population living in EU territory has tripled since 1960, when 
it stood at 172 million. Although in 2015 the EU experienced natural popu-
lation decline (i. e., an excess of deaths over births) for the first time in its 
history, continued migration is expected to fuel further population growth. 
According to the baseline projection scenario of Eurostat, the total popula-
tion of EU-28 is expected to grow to 528 million by 2050, while the high mi-
gration scenario propels the EU-28 population even further to 547 million. 
However, with the looming secession of the United Kingdom from the Euro-
pean Union, the EU’s earlier rapid population growth through territorial en-
largement will reverse. If the United Kingdom leaves as scheduled in March 
2019, the EU population is expected to contract by 13 percent, from 515 mil-
lion to 448 million. Even the high migration scenario of Eurostat envisages 
an EU population that remains well below the 500 million mark by 2050. 
Following turbulent changes and declines in period fertility through-
out the 1980s and 1990s, fertility in Europe appeared to split into a 
north-west vs. south-east divide. Northern and Western Europe (with 
the exception of Germany, Austria and Switzerland) reached moder-
ately low fertility, with the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR) at 1.7–2.0. 
All other regions in Europe had either low or very low TFR, typically 
reaching between 1.2 and 1.4. This regional differentiation was firmly 
established by the late 1990s, and was retained during the period of 
gradual recovery in fertility during the 2000s. 
However, the fertility divide began to narrow following the onset 
of the economic recession in Europe, often continuing on even after 
the recession ended. Period TFR has increased vigorously in Eastern 
Europe, in part supported by pronatalist policies in Russia, Belarus 
and Ukraine. Fertility also recovered in Central-Eastern Europe, South-
Eastern Europe as well as in Austria, Switzerland and Germany, where 
it reached the highest level since the 1970s. The TFR of several re-
gions – Eastern Europe, Central-Eastern Europe and Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland, now occupies a previously vacant ‘medium’ posi-
tion, at around 1.5–1.7. In contrast, the TFR has declined over the last 
decade in Western Europe and the Nordic countries, bringing fertility 
below the peaks reached around 2008–2010. As a result, regional 
and cross-country fertility differences have reduced across Europe in 
the last decade. This surprising regional regrouping of period TFR in 
Europe has taken place at a time when TFR in the United States con-
tinued on a downward trajectory, reducing the fertility discrepancy 
between the United States and European Union.
Changes in labour force size present one of the main challenges 
coming from population aging in the European Union. While la-
bour supply (labour force size) does not develop independently 
of labour demand, trajectories of future labour supply can be 
estimated by combining various scenarios of labour force par-
ticipation with population projections. Such projections are pro-
duced regularly by national institutions as well as international 
organizations. Here we go one step further, factoring in not only 
changing population structure by age and sex, but simultane-
ously considering changes in the highest level of educational at-
tainment. This allows us to take into account that 1) labour force 
participation rates vary not only by age and between men and 
women, but also by education, and 2) populations are not only 
changing in their age structure, but also in their educational 
composition (see data on the front page of this datasheet).
The current (2015) labour force in the European Union com-
prises of about 245 million workers. In order to estimate a range 
of future labour supply up to 2060, we defined three scenarios 
for labour force participation: 1) Constant scenario, where age-, 
sex- and education-specific labour force participation rates 
are held constant at the 2014 –16 levels; 2) Equalization sce-
nario, which takes into account the effect of strong increases 
in women’s participation in the labour market, and assumes 
that female participation rates by age and education reach cur-
rent country-specific levels recorded for males; and, finally, 3) 
Swedish scenario, assuming that labour supply in each coun-
try would develop towards age-, sex- and education-specific 
participation rates currently observed in Sweden. This scenario 
draws from the vanguard position of Sweden, which serves as 
a model in terms of high levels of female labour force participa-
tion and participation above age 50.
The outcomes of these three scenarios are illustrated here for 
the EU-28 when applying country-specific assumptions. While 
constant participation rates would lead to a decrease in labour 
supply by 13 % by 2060, a continued strong increase in female 
labour market attachment would reduce this decrease to only 
about 8 %. At the same time, labour force size in the Swedish 
scenario would maintain near stability.
Our approach to calculating projections allows us to make state-
ments about the future composition of labour supply by educa-
tion. For example, under the constant participation scenario, 
the number of persons in the labour force with higher than 
secondary education is projected to expand by about 45 %. The 
expected reduction in labour force size would only come from 
the population with lower and upper secondary education. 
As a result, the composition of the labour force would change 
considerably. Further details and country-specific results can 
be found in the recently published report on Demographic and 
human capital scenarios for the 21st century (Lutz et al. 2018).
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The number of life years spent in good health – Healthy Life Years 
(HLY) – presents yet another approach to measuring population 
health. Using data from the 2015 EU-SILC survey, these maps illus-
trate the proportion of HLY relative to total life expectancy by gender. 
As the lighter shades of blue indicate, females spend a lower pro-
portion of their lives in good health, while they experience higher 
overall life expectancy compared to males. This phenomenon has 
been coined in the literature as the “male-female health-mortality 
paradox”, with many researchers seeking to understand the underly-
ing mechanisms that lead to such differentials. Some claim that these 
observed differentials are not paradoxical per se, rather that they are 
a consequence of the fact that women live longer. Evidence attempt-
ing to explain the underlying factors for this gap in HLY, and to what 
extent the gap results from excess female morbidity or higher female 
life expectancy, remains inconclusive. 
Besides gender disparities in health, the maps also show regional dif-
ferentials. The gradient of HLY varies throughout Europe, with Sweden 
showing the best health scenario and Portugal the worst, for both 
sexes. These observed country differences in HLY have been primarily 
attributed to differences in education, employment rates, GDP and 
expenditure on elderly care, as well as differences in the extent of 
small-scale economic deprivation. 
However, there are also some potentially inconsistent cases that de-
serve a word of caution, particularly when considering neighbouring 
countries with similar levels of economic development, welfare state 
systems and overall life expectancy. For instance, the surprisingly 
low HLY for Finland and Denmark compared to their Scandinavian 
neighbour Sweden may not accurately reflect real health conditions 
in these countries and differences between them. The same holds for 
Austria (low HLY) and Germany (high HLY). Such results may expose 
issues in measuring and reporting health, which can vary from survey 
to survey. 
What explains these possible inconsistencies? The HLY measure uses 
the ”Global Activity Limitation Indicator” (GALI), which is based on 
a question from the EU-SILC survey (European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions). The question asks, “For the past 6 
months or more, have you been limited in activities people usually do 
because of a health problem?” with response options, “Yes, strongly 
limited |Yes, limited |No, not limited”. 
Such survey-based health measures require careful interpretation. In 
contrast to conventional life expectancy, which is derived from popula-
tion-wide mortality data, survey results are sensitive to cultural-specific 
perceptions of health limitations and even translation differences. The 
sensitivity of health measures can result in health information that is 
incomparable between countries because the self-reported information 
about people’s health might not reflect their objective health status. 
The educational composition in most European countries has been 
changing rapidly as they have undertaken large efforts to expand 
higher education. As a result, the share of population with higher 
education rose rapidly. This shift is clear when comparing the work-
ing age population with a post-secondary education in 2015 between 
age groups 25–39 (born in 1976–1990) and 50–64 (the parent “baby 
boomer” generation, born in 1951–1965). With the exception of three 
countries (Finland, Estonia and Lithuania), the younger active gen-
eration is more educated than the older generation. Increases in the 
share with post-secondary education degrees have been substantial 
(more than 20 percentage points difference) in some countries such 
as Cyprus, France, Hungary, Ireland, Poland and Portugal. Generational 
replacement and a continuation of the trend would imply further in-
creases in the overall level of educational attainment in many European 
countries. The figure also shows that there is a huge diversity between 
the countries represented: from Macedonia with 14% of its 20–39 
population with a post-secondary education to Ireland with 65 %.
The educational attainment of women in Europe has been growing to 
the point that more younger women than men have now completed 
upper secondary and tertiary education. This is illustrated here compar-
ing the share of young women and men (aged 25–39) with a bachelor 
degree or higher. Independent of the higher education rate of a given 
country, the share of young women with at least a bachelor degree is 
always higher than the share of men, with Austria and Switzerland be-
ing the only exceptions. At the two extremes of pursuing post-second-
ary education are Portugal, where only 6 % of people aged 25–39 have 
a bachelor degree (5 % men, 7 % women), and Lithuania, where 43 % 
of young people have a bachelor degree (37 % men, 48 % women).
Data source and further information: 
Lutz W., A. Goujon, S. KC, M. Stonawski, and N. Stilianakis (Eds). 2018. Demo-
graphic and human capital scenarios for the 21st century. Luxembourg: Publica-
tions Office of the European Union [pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15226/]. 
The data are available online at: www.wittgensteincentre.org/dataexplorer (Ver-
sion 2.0 forthcoming)
Dependency ratios measure the number of dependent (non-work-
ing) persons in a population in relation to the number of workers. 
Dependency ratios are usually used to illustrate, measure, and project 
the economic consequences of demographic change.
Demographic Dependency Ratio
The Demographic Dependency Ratio approximates the population of 
dependents and workers using age as the defining characteristic. The 
Demographic Dependency Ratio is a sum of two components: 1) the 
Youth Dependency Ratio, which relates the number of persons be-
low age 20 (regarded as dependents) to the number of persons aged 
20-64 (regarded as workers) and 2) the Old Age Dependency Ratio, 
which similarly relates the number of persons aged 65+ (regarded as 
dependents) to those aged 20-64. Although the Demographic De-
pendency Ratio is a useful summary measure of the population age 
structure, it tells little about actual economic dependency. 
Employment-based Dependency Ratio
The Employment-based Dependency Ratio relates the number of per-
sons who are not employed to the number of employed persons.  Its 
value in the 25 analysed countries is at 1.32 dependents per worker, 
which is considerably higher than the value for the Demographic 
Dependency Ratio at 0.66. The difference between these two val-
ues reflects the large number of persons in working age who are not 
employed, either because they are studying, unemployed, retired, or 
otherwise do not participate in the labour market. The Employment-
based Dependency Ratio is lowest in countries with high employment 
rates at older ages and low overall unemployment, such as in Sweden, 
Switzerland, Norway or Iceland, despite their relatively old populations.
 
The Life Cycle Deficit: a dependency measure based on la-
bour income and consumption
The aggregate Life Cycle Deficit (LCD) uses the difference between 
consumption and labour income as a measure of dependency. The
aggregate LCD consists of two components: 1) the aggregate LCD of 
children, defined as the difference between consumption and labour 
income of the child population relative to total labour income, and 2) 
the aggregate LCD of the elderly, defined as the difference between 
consumption and labour income of the elderly population relative to 
total labour income. Dependent age-ranges are characterised by av-
erage age-specific consumption exceeding labour income. In the 25 
European Union countries analysed, children until the age of 25 and 
elderly persons from the age of 59 onwards are dependent. The ag-
gregate LCD has to be financed by transfers, asset income or dissaving. 
In 2010, high values for the aggregate LCD were associated with high 
levels of public dissaving. Therefore, the LCD was high in countries with 
a large public deficit at the time, such as Greece and Lithuania.
Reference:
Istenič, T., B. Hammer, A. Šeme, A. Lotrič Dolinar, and J. Sambt. 2017. European 
National Transfer Accounts. Available at: www.wittgensteincentre.org/ntadata
Definition of regions
Definition of regions in the regional overview takes into account geographical, 
historical and geopolitical divisions, as well as similarity in demographic trends in 
countries they cover. Countries are grouped into regions as follows: Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden); Western Europe (Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom); Southern Europe (Cyprus, 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain); Central-Eastern Europe (Croatia, Czechia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia); South-Eastern 
Europe (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia); Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine); Caucasus 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia).
European Union (28) refers to the current (2018) territory of 28 member states. 
 European Union (27) refers to European Union without the United Kingdom. EU-
15 refers to the EU member states prior to 2004; EU-13 (new members) covers coun-
tries accessing the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013.
Contribution of migration and natural population change to 
long-term population growth in Europe, 1990–2017
Regional overview: key indicators
Regional trends in period Total Fertility Rates:  
An end to the “great divergence” in European fertility?
Three future labour force scenarios for EU-28 countries Healthy Life Years: paradoxes and challenges
Expansion of post-secondary education: women firstEconomic dependency ratios
The EU population: Past expansions through enlargement and 
population growth, future shrinking after the Brexit?
Eastern Europe
Relative population change due to migration (%)
Relative natural population change (%)
Overall relative population change between 
1990 and 2017 (%)
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Region Population 
(millions)
Proportion 
of foreign 
born popula-
tion (%)
Total 
population 
increase (%)
Total 
fertility 
rate (TFR)
Tempo 
and parity 
adjusted 
TFR
Mean age 
at first birth 
(years)
Completed 
cohort 
fertility
women 
born 1976
Life expectancy  
at birth (years)
Old-age 
dependency 
ratio 65+/ 
20–64 (%)
Region
Women Men
1.1.2017 1.1.2017 1990–2017 2016 2014 2016 2016 1.1.2017
Nordic countries 26.8 14 16 1.75 1.93 29.1 1.95 83.9 79.9 33 Nordic countries
Western Europe 166.7 14 17 1.82 2.11 28.9 1.95 84.2 79.5 32 Western Europe
Germany, Austria, Switzerland 99.7 16 7 1.58 1.59 29.5 1.58 83.7 78.9 34 Germany, Austria, Switzerland
Southern Europe 129.6 11 11 1.35 1.48 30.7 1.42 85.6 80.4 35 Southern Europe
Central-Eastern Europe 76.2 4 -3 1.48 1.57 27.5 1.64 81.5 73.9 28 Central-Eastern Europe
South-Eastern Europe 44.6 2 -14 1.56 1.75 26.6 1.76 78.8 72.4 30 South-Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe 202.5 - -5 1.70 1.69 25.4 1.61 77.2 66.8 23 Eastern Europe
Caucasus 16.5 - 3 2.02 2.03 24.8 1.80 77.7 71.6 15 Caucasus
European Union (28) 511.7 11 8 1.59 1.75 29.1 1.69 83.8 78.3 33 European Union (28)
European Union (27) 445.9 11 7 1.56 1.69 29.1 1.65 83.9 78.2 33 European Union (27)
EU-15 407.4 13 12 1.61 1.78 29.6 1.70 84.5 79.6 34 EU-15
EU-13 (new members) 104.3 4 -7 1.51 1.62 27.2 1.63 80.9 73.4 29 EU-13 (new members)
Authors: Tomáš Sobotka and Kryštof Zeman (data collec-
tion and coordination), Vanessa di Lego, Anne Goujon, Bern-
hard Hammer, Elke Loichinger, Markus Sauerberg and Marc 
Luy. Copy editing: Nicholas Gailey. Administrative assistance: 
Inga Freund and Lisa Janisch. Graphic design: Christian Högl.
Suggested citation: Vienna Institute of Demography 
(VID) and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA). 2018. European Demographic Datasheet 2018. Witt-
genstein Centre (IIASA, VID/OEAW, WU), Vienna.    
Available at www.populationeurope.org.
65 %
75 %
85 %
95 %
HLY0/LE0
Women
65 %
75 %
85 %
95 %
HLY0/LE0
Men
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
Southern Europe 
Western Europe 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland
Nordic countries 
Central-eastern Europe 
South-eastern Europe 
Eastern Europe 
EU-28 
USA 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
171.6
406.7
528.6514.8
547.6
451.0
466.3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
20
45
20
50
Nu
m
be
r o
f E
U 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s
Number of EU member states
EU population 
(actual territory),
million
EU population,
28 countries as of 2018, million
EU: 27 member 
states after Brexit 
Projection: baseline
Projection: high migr.
Projection: baseline
Projection: high migr.
Po
pu
lat
ion
 (m
illi
on
)
245
227
246
214
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Pr
oje
cte
d l
ab
ou
r f
or
ce
 si
ze
 (m
illi
on
s)
Swedish scenario Equalization scenario Constant scenario
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
0
50
100
150
200
250
To
ta
l p
ro
jec
te
d l
ab
ou
r f
or
ce
 (m
illi
on
s)
BA degree
MA+ degree
Lower secondary or lower
Upper secondary
Short post-secondary
Youth
dependency ratio:
0.35
Total demographic 
dependency ratio:
0.66
Old age
dependency ratio:
0.31
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
Po
pu
lat
ion
 in
 10
00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 8070 90 100
Age
Young and old (dependent) Working age
Source: EUROSTAT. EU25 refers to the EU countries without Malta, Croatia and the Netherlands.
Total employment-based
dependency ratio:
1.32
0
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
Po
pu
lat
ion
 in
 10
00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Age
Non-employed (dependent) Employed
Source: EUROSTAT, LFS 2015. EU25 refers to the EU countries without Malta, Croatia and the Netherlands.
Aggregate LCD
of children:
0.27
Total aggregate LCD:
0.54
Aggregate LCD
of elderly population:
0.27
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
Nu
m
be
r o
f e

cie
nt
 pr
od
uc
er
s i
n 1
00
0
(e

cie
nt
 pr
od
uc
er
 =
 av
g.
 la
bo
ur
 in
co
m
e a
t a
ge
 30
−
49
)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Age
Life cycle decit (dependent) Labour income
Source: Istenič et al. (2017). EU25 refers to the EU countries without MT, HR and NL.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
M
ac
ed
on
ia
Az
er
ba
ija
n
M
old
ov
a
Bo
sn
ia-
He
rze
go
vin
a
Al
ba
nia
Uk
ra
ine Ita
ly
M
on
te
ne
gr
o
Se
rb
ia
Tu
rk
ey
Cr
oa
tia
Cz
ec
hia
Ar
m
en
ia
Slo
va
kia
Be
lar
us
Bu
lga
ria
Slo
ve
nia
Po
rtu
ga
l
Ro
m
an
ia
M
alt
a
La
tv
ia
Au
str
ia
Ru
ssi
a
Be
lgi
um
Fin
lan
d
Ice
lan
d
De
nm
ar
k
Hu
ng
ar
y
Po
lan
d
Un
ite
d S
ta
te
s
Sw
itz
er
lan
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Ge
rm
an
y
Ne
th
er
lan
ds
Sp
ain
Gr
ee
ce
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
Fr
an
ce
Es
to
nia
Sw
ed
en
No
rw
ay
Ge
or
gia
Cy
pr
us
Lit
hu
an
ia
Ja
pa
n
Ire
lan
d
Share of total population 25–39 with a post-secondary education
Share of total population 50–64 with a post-secondary education
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Po
rtu
ga
l
Be
lgi
um
Au
str
ia
Bo
sn
ia-
He
rze
go
vin
a
M
on
te
ne
gr
o
Cr
oa
tia
Slo
ve
nia
Gr
ee
ce
Cz
ec
hia
Fr
an
ce
Sw
itz
er
lan
d
Ita
ly
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
Ge
rm
an
y
Hu
ng
ar
y
Slo
va
kia
La
tv
ia
Ru
ssi
a
Sp
ain
Ro
m
an
ia
Ice
lan
d
Un
ite
d S
ta
te
s
Sw
ed
en
De
nm
ar
k
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
rw
ay
Ire
lan
d
Bu
lga
ria
Es
to
nia
Fin
lan
d
Ge
or
gia
Ne
th
er
lan
ds
Po
lan
d
Lit
hu
an
ia
Bachelor + male 25–39
Bachelor + female 25–39
Population change in selected countries, 1990–2017 (in %)
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